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South Africa and the United Nations 
Human Rights Council
Eduard Jordaan*
AbSTRACT
This article assesses South Africa’s foreign policy commitment to human 
rights by studying the country’s role in the United Nations Human Rights 
Council, which began its work in 2006. South Africa’s behavior is evalu-
ated in terms of its participation in four aspects of the Council’s work: 
the institution-building phase that took place during the body’s first year, 
country-specific human rights issues, thematic human rights problems, and 
the Universal Periodic Review. It is concluded that South Africa has become 
a defender of unpalatable regimes and an obstacle to the international 
promotion of human rights. 
I. INTRodUCTIoN
One year before South Africa held its first democratic elections, Nelson 
Mandela published an article in Foreign Affairs promising that the newly 
democratic South Africa’s foreign policy would center on the promotion of 
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human rights.1 South Africa certainly tried to uphold this promise, but before 
long it retreated from its lofty commitments. There is wide agreement that 
South Africa scaled back the human rights component in its foreign policy,2 
but the extent of this retreat is still in dispute.
There are three broad perspectives on the matter. The first perspective 
sees South Africa as still strongly committed to the human rights cause. In 
this regard, Alison Brysk groups South Africa with good international citi-
zens like Sweden and Canada. Brysk notes that South Africa has gone “from 
pariah to promoter” of human rights and is a “role model to other emerg-
ing regional powers, demonstrating that underdevelopment, non-Western 
culture, and historic divisions are not necessarily impediments to an active 
and principled foreign policy.”3 Chris Landsberg notes that although South 
Africa has struggled to operationalize the “responsibility to protect,” it is an 
“avid champion” of this norm.4 Importantly, the South African government 
understands itself as adhering to this perspective, declaring that “South Africa 
attaches great importance to the promotion of human rights.”5 In the pledge 
South Africa made in support of its own candidacy for a United Nations 
Human Rights Council (HRC) seat, South African representatives stated that 
the country “by its very nature . . . takes the international human rights 
agenda very seriously.”6 
The second perspective occupies the middle ground and views South 
Africa’s foreign policy as no more and no less committed to human rights 
than other democracies. In this view, South Africa’s foreign policy is marked 
by ambiguity and the “pragmatic” pursuit of a variety of foreign policy goals.7 
Finally, the third perspective argues that South Africa is worse than 
other democracies. From this view, South Africa has become a country that 
actively shields regimes with odious human rights records and that obstructs 
the international human rights cause. This perspective found its most suc-
cinct expression in Michael Gershon’s Washington Post article that labeled 
South Africa as a “rogue democracy,” a country that “remains an example 
 1. Nelson Mandela, South Africa’s Future Foreign Policy, 75 Foreign AFF. 86, 87 (1993).
 2. Id. at 87; Tiyanjana Maluwa, Human Rights and Foreign Policy in Post-Apartheid South 
Africa, in HumAn rigHts And CompArAtive Foreign poliCy: FoundAtions oF peACe 1, 2 (David 
P. Forsythe ed., 2002).
 3. Alison Brysk, gloBAl good sAmAritAns: HumAn rigHts As Foreign poliCy 171 (2009). 
 4. Chris Landberg, Pax South Africana and the Responsibility to Protect, 2 gloBAl resp. to 
proteCt 436, 457 (2010).
 5. Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, Minister of Int’l Relations and Cooperation of South Africa, 
Statement to the 16th Session of the U.N. Human Rights Council (28 Feb. 2011).
 6. The Permanent Mission of the Rep. of S. Afr. to the U.N., Aide-Memoire In Support 
of S. Afr.’s Candidature of the Human Rights Council, Note no. 142/06 (2 May 2006), 
available at http://www.un.org/ga/60/elect/hrc/southafrica.pdf.
 7. JAmes BArBer, mAndelA’s World 85–115 (2004); David Black, Lever or Cover? South Africa, 
Multilateral Institutions and the Promotion of Human Rights, in soutH AFriCA’s multilAterAl 
diplomACy And gloBAl CHAnge: tHe limits oF reFormism 76, 77 (Philip Nel et al. eds., 2001). 
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of freedom—while devaluing and undermining the freedom of others . . . 
the product of a conscience it does not display.”8 
There is evidence to support each perspective’s argument. However, 
none of these perspectives focus on South Africa’s role in the HRC. Once 
South Africa’s actions at the HRC are examined, the picture that emerges is 
one that strongly affirms the third perspective: South Africa is a defender of 
oppressive regimes and an obstacle to the international promotion of human 
rights. Admittedly, South Africa’s record on the international promotion of 
human rights has been mixed, but once South Africa’s actions on the HRC 
are included in the analyses, the weight of the evidence makes it very dif-
ficult to defend the first two perspectives mentioned above.
The focus on South Africa’s role in the HRC is of primary importance 
because of the significance that South Africa itself places on the HRC. South 
Africa’s most recent foreign policy blueprint stated that the government at-
taches “great importance” to the HRC,9 an institution with “first instance” 
responsibility for human rights.10 Furthermore, South Africa has used various 
international platforms, including the Security Council, the General As-
sembly, and the summit meetings of the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue 
Forum, to assert that the HRC is the most appropriate forum for addressing 
international human rights problems. 
In addition to the importance South Africa places on the HRC, the 
country’s actions on this body are illustrative of South Africa’s wider foreign 
policy. There is a high degree of repetition to the debates and votes that 
take place in the HRC. Such repetitiveness makes it likely that country votes 
and statements in the HRC are the result of extensive deliberation and over-
sight and thus well integrated with the rest of the country’s foreign policy. 
A country’s vote in the HRC yields a reasonably clear view of its position. 
Country statements before the HRC, despite being plagued by diversion and 
double-speak, give us further insight into a country’s motivation. Furthermore 
the structured and repetitive nature of business in the HRC allows for fairly 
straightforward comparisons between countries. Admittedly, a focus on South 
Africa’s role in the HRC does not offer a complete picture of the country’s 
commitment to human rights—it leaves out what happens in bilateral and 
other multilateral settings—but there is little evidence to suggest that South 
Africa’s behavior at the HRC is out of step with its actions elsewhere. 
 8. Michael Gerson, The Despots’ Democracy, WAsH. post, 28 May 2008, available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/27/AR2008052702556.html. 
 9. S. Afr. Dep’t. Int’l Relations & Cooperation, Strategic Plan 2011-2014, at 19 (2011), 
available at http://www.dfa.gov.za/department/strategicplan%202011-014/strategic%20
plan%202011.pdf.
10. U.N. GAOR, 65th Sess., 42d Plen. Mtg., Statement by Ambassador Baso Sangqu, Per-
manent Representative of S. Afr. on the Report of the Human Rights Council (2 Nov. 
2010), available at http://www.southafrica-newyork.net/speeches_pmun/view_speech.
php?speech=3810844.
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The rest of this article consists of four sections and a conclusion. The first 
section focuses on South Africa’s participation in the “institution-building” 
phase of the HRC. The following three sections are organized around three 
broad areas of the HRC’s work: country-specific issues, thematic issues, and 
the Universal Periodic Review (UPR). Emphasis falls on matters on which 
states in the HRC were significantly divided because such disagreements 
allow for a clearer comparison of South Africa to other countries. Apart from 
the usual sources, such as UN records and academic and NGO publications, 
this research also draws from interviews conducted in February and March 
2011 with relevant international civil servants, diplomats, representatives of 
human rights NGOs in Switzerland, analysts at think tanks in South Africa, 
and academics in both countries. 
An understanding of the HRC’s bloc politics is necessary to this analysis. 
The HRC consists of forty-seven members, with thirteen seats for African 
states, thirteen to Asia, eight seats for Latin American and Caribbean states, 
six seats for Eastern European states, and seven seats for Western Europe and 
Others Group (WEOG) states. Judging by the number of statements before 
the HRC, the Latin American and Caribbean and the African Groups are 
most likely to act as a bloc. Two non-geographic organizations, the Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM) and especially the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC) have considerable influence in the HRC. As HRC action 
depends on approval by a simple majority, the major source of power in 
the HRC is numbers. Developing countries far outnumber industrialized 
countries. Sliced differently, the African and Asian Groups occupy twenty-
six of the forty-seven seats, which Bertrand Ramcharan, a former acting 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, considers a “key problem.”11 
Moreover, during the HRC’s first year, twenty-eight states were members 
of the NAM, while seventeen were members of the OIC. During the same 
period, only twenty-five of the HRC’s forty-seven members were considered 
“free” according to Freedom House, a US-based non-governmental research 
institute. Although states do not always vote in line with their regions or the 
organizations to which they belong, such associations bring a high degree 
of predictability to votes and debates in the HRC. A report to the Canadian 
parliament, for instance, noted that during the HRC’s first year, many of the 
votes were split 33-12 or 34-11, as the WEOG and its Eastern European and 
Asian allies were outvoted by the rest of the world.12 
South Africa’s principal loyalties are to the African Group and other 
developing countries, often represented by the NAM. These two groups often 
make statements before the HRC that emphasize respect for national sover-
eignty, an insistence that often clashes with the promotion of human rights. 
Among the larger states in the African Group—Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, and 
11. BertrAnd g. rAmCHArAn, tHe un HumAn rigHts CounCil 13 (2011).
12. A. rAynell AndreyCHuk & JoAn FrAser, CAnAdiAn senAte stAnding Committee on HumAn rigHts, 
CAnAdA And tHe united nAtions HumAn rigHts CounCil: At tHe CrossroAds 30 (2007).
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South Africa—Algeria and Egypt are among the most obstructive delegations 
on the HRC. Although there is pressure on African states to conform to the 
Group line,13 which has often been obstructive of international efforts to 
promote human rights,14 there have been deviations from the African Group’s 
conservative line. Mauritius and Zambia are the most frequent defectors, but 
Burkina Faso and Ghana have also on numerous occasions voted differently 
from the larger states in the African Group. Such deviations are important 
because it means that the grip of the African Group is not so strong that 
its members cannot vote how they want. South Africa, however, has rarely 
deviated from the more obstructive states in the African Group.15 Accord-
ing to one interviewee, the African Group will not adopt a position unless 
South Africa consents; therefore when Algeria or Egypt speaks on behalf of 
the African Group it is safe to assume South Africa is on board.16
II. INSTITUTIoN-bUILdING pHASE
The HRC replaced the UN Commission for Human Rights (CHR) in 2006.17 
General Assembly Resolution 60/251, which established the HRC, settled 
some of the disagreements over the structure of the HRC, notably over mem-
bership, but also left many matters to settle. The HRC’s institution-building 
phase lasted a year, ending 30 June 2007. It was an acrimonious period. 
During this time, any hope that the HRC would be significantly better than 
its ignominious predecessor was soon waylaid. The major task became 
preventing the dismantling of the CHR mechanisms, rather than focusing 
on strengthening preexisting structures and mechanisms. 
The African Group, during discussions about reforming the CHR in 
June 2005, “stressed the importance of preserving the strengths of the Com-
mission.”18 However, as the HRC began its work, the African Group, with 
South Africa’s support, featured prominently in efforts to undermine those 
13. Statement by Nigeria, U.N.H.R.C., 17th Sess., 31st plen. mtg., HRC Video Archive (17 
June 2011), http://www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/archive.asp?go=110617.
14. rAmCHArAn, supra note 11, at 13.
15. South Africa’s only clear departure from the conservative members in the African Group 
in a pro-human rights direction came in 2011 when South Africa took the lead on a 
resolution on sexual orientation and gender identity. South Africa also abstained on 
resolutions on North Korea, whereas Egypt and Nigeria voted against. However, South 
Africa once voted even more conservatively than the rest of the African Group when it 
was the only state to vote against Council resolution 10/25, an EU-sponsored resolution 
on religious tolerance. 
16. Interview with International Civil Servant, in Geneva (23 Feb. 2012).
17 Report of the Sixty-Second Session of the Commission on Human Rights, G.A. Res. 
60/251, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/251 (15 Mar. 2006).
18. U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., Summary of the Open-Ended Informal Consultations held by 
the Commission on Human Rights Pursuant to Economic and Social Council Decision 
2005/217, ¶53, U.N. Doc. A/59/847-E/2005/73 (25 June 2001), available at http://
www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/summary_En.pdf.
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strengths. South Africa allied itself with states that pushed a “negative reform” 
agenda, a numerically superior camp that included China, Cuba, Russia, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and other OIC states.19 During the institution-building 
period, Algeria did most of the talking on behalf of the African Group. South 
Africa, however, fully supported Algeria. In fact, in 2008, the South African 
ambassador on the HRC paid tribute to Algeria for its contribution to the 
institution-building phase, gushing that it had been “a source of inspiration” 
to work closely with the Algerian delegation “for the common cause of 
promoting and protecting all human rights throughout the world.”20
The HRC’s system of expert advice was one mechanism that South Africa 
and its allies attempted to weaken. The CHR’s system of expert advice, the 
Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, played 
an important role in setting human rights standards, as it provided guidance 
on the interpretation of human rights norms and identified new areas of 
human rights concerns and gaps in current human rights protection. Many 
of these initiatives originated with the Sub-Commission, rather than at the 
request of the CHR.21 However, the restricting of the Sub-Commission began 
in 2000 and continued during the HRC’s institution-building phase, when it 
was renamed the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee. During this 
time, South Africa and the rest of the African Group figured prominently in 
efforts to limit the flow of information, to protect states from scrutiny, and to 
keep the whole process as state-dominated as possible. The African Group 
maintained that the studies of the expert body should not inform UPR reports 
and should only be for the HRC’s use. Interestingly, Zambia broke with the 
group, arguing that the expert body should also be available for use by other 
human rights mechanisms.22 The African Group further argued that the expert 
body should only undertake tasks assigned to it by the HRC.23 In its usual 
aversion to country-specific scrutiny, the African Group stressed that the 
expert body should not deal with any country-specific issues, only thematic 
issues.24 Finally, the African Group supported the view that members of the 
Advisory Committee should be elected by the HRC from a list of candidates 
nominated by states, rather than from a list drawn up by the Office of the 
19. int’l serv. For HumAn rigHts (isHr), HumAn rigHts CounCil Working grp. on revieW oF 
meCHAnisms And mAndAtes, 13–24 novemBer 2006: report on tHe revieW oF speCiAl proCedures, 
4 (2007), available at http://olddoc.ishr.ch/hrm/council/wg/wg_reports/wg_review_sps.
pdf.
20. Statement by South Africa, Review of Algeria, U.N.H.R.C., U.P.R., 1st Sess., HRC Video 
Archive (14 Apr. 2008), http://www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/archive.asp?go=080414.
21. Meghna Abraham, Building the New Human Rights Council: Outcome and Analysis of 
the Institution-Building Year, Dialogue on Globalization No. 33, at 16 (2007).
22. isHr, HumAn rigHts CounCil Working group on revieW oF meCHAnisms And mAndAtes dis-
Cussions on tHe expert Body, 5 (2006), available at http://olddoc.ishr.ch/hrm/council/wg/
wg_reports/wg_review_expertadvice.pdf.
23. Id.
24. Id.
Vol. 3696 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).25 While not all the African 
proposals were accepted, in the end the powers of the Advisory Committee 
were limited to the extent that it has become of “marginal importance.”26 
South Africa also participated in the weakening of the HRC’s complaint 
procedure, principally by making it harder for victims to raise complaints 
and by giving states stronger defenses against potential scrutiny. The CHR’s 
main complaint procedure, the 1503 Procedure, became the blueprint for 
the HRC’s complaint procedure and was intended to enable victims and 
those acting on their behalf to bring attention to instances that “appear to 
reveal a consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested violations of hu-
man rights and fundamental freedoms.”27 During the institution-building 
phase, the African Group held that for violations to be serious enough for 
consideration, each should be “gross and systematic” rather than merely 
part of a “consistent pattern” (“systematic” was defined as “willful action 
that is part of a pattern”).28 As abuse might be large-scale but not system-
atic, the African Group’s requirement that abuse be “systematic” limits the 
situational applicability of the procedure and raises the burden of proof for 
victims.29 Moreover, while no state questioned that the HRC should hear 
complaints about “gross” violations of human rights, South Africa and others 
explicitly opposed expanding the range of permissible violations to “gross 
or serious,”30 arguing that such a broadening would overburden an already 
strained procedure. Finally, the African Group proposed a further narrowing 
of the 1503 Procedure—that complaints may only come from victims, not 
from organizations speaking on their behalf, because such organizations 
might not be “trustworthy.”31 
The African Group also made various attempts to assist states in the face 
of complaints. Under the 1503 Procedure complaints passed through two 
committees. The first of these, the Working Group on Communications, would 
do the initial screening of complaints. Complaints that qualified would then 
pass to the second committee, the Working Group on Situations, which was 
made up of state representatives. This second committee would then make 
recommendations to the plenary of the HRC. The African Group wanted 
25. Id. at 4.
26. Karen E. Smith, The European Union and the Review of the Human Rights Council 27 
EXPO/B/DROI/2010/06 (2011).
27. E.S.C. Res. 1503, ¶ 5. U.N. Doc. E/4832/Add.1 (27 May 1970).
28. isHr, HumAn rigHts CounCil 3rd session dAily updAte 3 (2006), available at http://www.
ishr.ch/council-monitor/institution-building/complaint-procedure.
29. isHr, Working group on revieW oF meCHAnisms And mAndAtes: revieW oF tHe ComplAint 
proCedure, 14 (2006), available at http://olddoc.ishr.ch/hrm/council/wg/wg_reports/
wg_review_complaint.pdf.
30. isHr, Working group report: revieW oF ComplAint proCedure, 2nd session 4 (2007), available 
at http://olddoc.ishr.ch/hrm/council/wg/wg_reports/wg_review_complaint_02.pdf.
31. Id. at 5.
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the five regional groups to directly select experts to the Working Group on 
Communications from the HRC’s new expert advice body rather than have 
the OHCHR make the appointment or, as was the practice in the CHR, have 
the expert body designate the membership from its own ranks.32 The African 
Group also worked to contain the spread of information that pertained to 
abuse in a specific country. The African Group strongly objected to the pro-
posal that the Working Group on Situations should have the power to move 
cases from the confidential 1503 Procedure to the public 1235 Procedure 
when states failed to cooperate, whereas the CHR had given the Working 
Group this power.33 The African Group further wanted to ease what counted 
as non-cooperative action, objecting that a three-month deadline for states 
to respond to complaints was too short.34 The African Group also sought 
to limit the flow of information about human rights abuses by rejecting the 
linking of the complaint procedure to the UPR because it would contravene 
the confidentiality of the complaint procedure.35
Most serious of all was the attack on the special procedures system of 
the HRC, which Kofi Annan has praised as the “crown jewel” of the UN hu-
man rights machinery.36 The CHR developed a number of special procedures 
to examine and monitor human rights violations in a specific country or 
under a specific theme. Special procedures mandate holders would under-
take fact-finding missions to specific countries or to study specific themes, 
communicate with governments, and issue “urgent appeals” and “letters of 
allegation.” Although in 2005 the African Group had explicitly identified 
special procedures as worth maintaining,37 it now attempted to weaken this 
system. Three issues related to special procedures were particularly conten-
tious: mandate renewal, appointment of mandate holders, and a code of 
conduct for mandate holders.
The HRC inherited the country and thematic mandates that were in 
force when the CHR was closed down. Although the thematic mandates 
were not without controversy, country mandates elicited the most resistance. 
South Africa supported the African Group’s position that country mandates 
established without the consent of the state concerned should be terminated. 
32. Id. at 8.
33. isHr, Working group on revieW on meCHAnisms And mAndAtes: disCussions on ComplAint pro-
Cedure, 3rd session 7 (2007), available at http://olddoc.ishr.ch/hrm/council/wg/wg_reports/
wg_complaints_03.pdf.
34. Id. at 8.
35. isHr, Working group report: revieW oF ComplAint proCedure, 2nd session, supra note 30, 
at 9.
36. Press Release, United Nations, Annan Calls on Human Rights Council to Strive for Unity, 
Avoid Familiar Fault Lines (29 Nov. 2006), available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/
story.asp?NewsID=20770.
37. U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., Summary of the Open-Ended Informal Consultations, supra 
note 18, ¶ 53.
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When South Africa realized that country mandates were likely to continue, 
it tried to increase the threshold standard for human rights abuse that would 
warrant a country mandate. Thus, when Egypt objected to the words “serious 
violations” as the minimum to implement a country mandate and suggested 
“grave and systematic” instead, South Africa proposed that the level of abuse 
should be “grave and massive.”38 
South Africa also joined in efforts to limit the independence of the 
experts who were entrusted with special procedures mandates by trying to 
assert greater state control over expert appointment. Under the CHR, the 
Chair of the CHR appointed the human rights experts after consultation with 
the five regional groups. Such an appointment process lacked transparency, 
but provided for the appointment of experts not beholden to any particular 
regional group. During the institution-building phase, South Africa and the 
rest of the African Group maintained that potential mandate holders should 
be nominated by states rather than, for example, drawn from a list compiled 
by the OHCHR.39 The Council would then elect nominees directly, which 
would ostensibly “increase the credibility” of mandate holders.40 The obvi-
ous problem with the African Group’s proposal is that because the work of 
the mandate holders often involved criticism of states, their election and 
re-election would be directly dependent on the approval of the very entities 
they criticize. 
States frequently objected to special procedures reports by questioning 
the integrity of the mandate holder or alleging that he or she had gone beyond 
his or her mandate. The obvious solution, for many states, was to subject 
mandate holders to a code of conduct. The idea of such a code of conduct 
is not new, but it was the African Group that drove the issue in the HRC. 
Although Algeria led the African Group on this matter, South Africa was in 
full agreement. In an “especially strong” response to the work of the Special 
Rapporteur on the right to adequate housing and the Independent Expert on 
the promotion and protection of human rights while countering terrorism, 
South Africa charged that the mandate holders had behaved “disgracefully” 
and in a “perfidious” manner when they visited the country. To South Africa, 
such alleged behavior made obvious the need for a code of conduct.41 
In March 2007 the African Group first presented their proposed code of 
conduct. The African Group maintained that such a code was necessary to 
38. isHr, Working group on revieW on meCHAnisms And mAndAtes: report on tHe revieW oF spe-
CiAl proCedures 14 (2006), available at http://olddoc.ishr.ch/hrm/council/wg/wg_reports/
wg_review_sps.pdf.
39. isHr, HumAn rigHts CounCil 3rd session dAily updAte, supra note 28, at 5.
40. Abraham, supra note 21, at 25. 
41. isHr, Working group on revieW oF mAndAtes: speCiAl proCedures, HigHligHts 2 (2007), 
available at http://olddoc.ishr.ch/hrm/council/wg/wg_reports/highlights/wgsps_high-
lights_26_april_07.pdf.
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“enhance the moral authority and accountability of mandate holders.”42 Its 
purpose was to “spell out the consequences” of the independence of mandate 
holders.43 The African Group stressed that the independence of mandate hold-
ers was “absolute in nature,”44 yet repeatedly insisted that mandate holders 
were accountable to the HRC. Indeed, the African Group’s entire effort was 
directed at constraining mandate holders and strengthening states’ position 
vis-à-vis special procedure investigators, or, as the African Group put it, to 
increase “mutual trust” between states and mandate holders.45 
There are many examples of the African Group’s attempts to keep man-
date holders on a tight leash. The African Group wanted mandate holders to 
prepare their visit “in close collaboration” with the state’s permanent mission 
in Geneva; “finalise the official programme of their visits directly with the 
host country representatives;” and, while in the host country, remain for 
security reasons “in the care of the host authorities at all times.”46 As was 
pointed out, such close “collaboration” between the state and the mandate 
holder might compromise the anonymity of sources of information and 
might lead to the moving of witnesses before the mandate holder’s arrival.47 
The African Group also rejected the idea that mandate holders should only 
comply with national legislation in the host country if it was in accordance 
with international human rights principles.48 The African Group dismissed 
such a requirement as “too restrictive.”49 The African Group further sought to 
constrain and channel communications from the mandate holders in order 
to benefit states at the likely expense of victims of human rights abuses. For 
example, mandate holders were not to make public allegations of human 
rights violations without first informing the state concerned and giving the 
state “adequate time for investigation, reply and, when appropriate, action.”50 
Furthermore, mandate holders were to address communications, includ-
ing “urgent appeals,” not directly to the government, but to the country’s 
diplomatic mission in Geneva.51 Finally, the African Group sought to limit 
42. isHr, HumAn rigHts CounCil open-ended meeting Convened By tHe AFriCAn group on tHe Code 
oF ConduCt For speCiAl proCedures 1 (2007), available at http://olddoc.ishr.ch/hrm/council/
wg/specialprocedures/11_june_coc.pdf.
43. Id. at 2.
44. HRC, Code of Conduct for Mandate Holders of the Special Procedures of the Human 
Rights Council 2, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/5/L.3 (15 Jun. 2007).
45. isHr, Working group on revieW oF meCHAnisms And mAndAtes, 2nd session (2007), available 
at http://olddoc.ishr.ch/hrm/council/wg/wg_reports/wg_review_sps_february_2007.pdf.
46. HRC, Code of Conduct for Mandate Holders of the Special Procedures of the Human 
Rights Council, supra note 44, art. 3.
47. isHr, HumAn rigHts CounCil open-ended meeting Convened By tHe AFriCAn group on tHe Code 
oF ConduCt For speCiAl proCedures, supra note 42, at 4.
48. Id. at 2.
49. Id.
50. HRC, Code of Conduct for Mandate Holders of the Special Procedures of the Human 
Rights Council, supra note 44, art. 12a, 13c.
51. isHr, Working group on revieW on meCHAnisms And mAndAtes: report on tHe revieW oF speCiAl 
proCedures, supra note 38, at 22.
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direct interaction between special procedures and other mechanisms of the 
HRC, such as the UPR.52 
Some suggested that states should also be held to a code of conduct in 
their dealings with special procedures mandate holders. Non-compliance of 
states was a serious problem; states would refuse entry to mandate holders 
or often simply not reply to a request for a country visit. For instance, in a 
2009 report the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary 
Executions noted that of the forty-seven countries where invitations were 
requested, thirty-four failed to respond in a meaningful way, if at all.53 South 
Africa explicitly opposed the idea that states should also be subject to a 
code of conduct.54 The African Group held that it would be “simplistic” to 
compare the accountability of states with that of mandate holders. Appar-
ently, states could not be asked to meet the same level of accountability as 
mandate holders.55 The issuing of standing invitations to special procedures 
was one measure of state cooperativeness, and some states felt that it was 
incumbent upon HRC members to issue such invitations. However, South 
Africa maintained that such a measure of compliance should not be linked 
to HRC membership. The issuance of standing invitations remains, in South 
Africa’s view, a decision that should be made by sovereign states.56 
III. CoUNTRY-SpECIfIC RESoLUTIoNS
At the HRC, South Africa opposes the singling out of specific countries for 
their human rights records through country mandates.57 South Africa adheres 
to the belief that international pressure and “naming and shaming” are 
counterproductive, believing that quiet diplomacy is the better option. The 
most charitable interpretation of South Africa’s quiet diplomacy is that, at 
best, it is naïve. At worst, the practice is a shield for despotic regimes. Even 
so, South Africa has not been consistent in its opposition to international 
pressure. South Africa has explicitly called for greater international pressure 
on Israel58 and voted for all twenty-three of the typically harsh and one-
52. Id. at 30.
53. HRC, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development: Report of the Special Rap-
porteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, ¶10, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/2 
(27 May 2009) (by Philip Alston).
54. isHr, Working group on revieW on meCHAnisms And mAndAtes: disCussions on ComplAint 
proCedure, 3rd session, supra note 33.
55. isHr, Working group on revieW oF meCHAnisms And mAndAtes, 2nd session, supra note 45, 
at 17. 
56. Id. at 18. 
57. Statement by South Africa, U.N.H.R.C., 5th Sess., 4th plen. mtg., HRC Video Archive 
(12 June 2007), available at http://www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/archive.asp?go=070612.
58. Statement by South Africa, The Situation of Human Rights in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories, U.N.H.R.C., 6th Spec. Sess., 1st plen. mtg., HRC Video Archive (23 Jan. 
2008), available at http://www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/archive.asp?go=016.
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sided resolutions related to Israel that were presented during South Africa’s 
membership of the HRC.59 Ironically, democratic change in South Africa 
is itself partly the result of international pressure on the apartheid regime, 
as even the country’s top foreign officials recognize.60 It is noteworthy that 
while opposition to country-specific scrutiny is the official view of the Af-
rican Group, African states have frequently deviated from this stance. One 
is left with little option but to conclude that South Africa’s opposition to 
country-specific scrutiny is intended to protect unsavory regimes. The rest 
of this section runs through examples of such protection.
A. Myanmar
In January 2007, South Africa controversially voted against a Security 
Council resolution condemning human rights abuses in Myanmar. One of 
South Africa’s arguments was that the HRC, not the Security Council, was 
the appropriate place for addressing the human rights problems in Myan-
mar. However, at the HRC South Africa did little to address the situation in 
Myanmar. South Africa was not among the states that signed on to the EU’s 
request for the special session on Myanmar held on 2 October 2007. The 
resultant resolution “strongly deplore[d] the continued violent repression of 
peaceful demonstrations in Myanmar” and was adopted without a vote.61 
The African Group nevertheless used the occasion to object to the selective 
use of special sessions to criticize weak countries. Some African countries 
expressed strong views about the human rights situation in Myanmar—
Mauritius called for the “most stringent sanctions” and Zambia called for 
Myanmar to democratize62—but South Africa’s response was timid. South 
Africa stated that it “deeply regrets the recent violence and excessive use of 
force” and called for political dialogue and the immediate release of Aung 
59. For example, the resolution adopted at a HRC special session on Israel’s invasion of 
Lebanon in 2006, uses words such as “appalled,” “strongly condemning,” and “out-
raged,” which one seldom sees in resolutions on other countries. As an indication of 
one-sidedness, the resolution further calls for an investigation into Israel’s actions in 
Lebanon, but says nothing about Hezbollah’s role in the conflict. The Grave Situation 
of Human Rights in Lebanon Caused by Israeli Military Operations, HRC Res. S-2/1, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/S-2/1 (11 Aug. 2006).
60. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Africa, Address on the 
WCAR Debate (7 Nov. 2001), available at http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2001/
dzum1107.htm). 
61. Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, HRC Res. S-5/1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/S-5/1 
(2 Oct. 2007). 
62. isHr, HumAn rigHts CounCil, 5tH speCiAl session, situAtion in myAnmAr, 12 (2007), available 
at http://olddoc.ishr.ch/hrm/council/other/cmreports/specialsessions/ss_myanmar_2_oc-
tober_2007.pdf.
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San Suu Kyi.63 South Africa also pandered to the other side by thanking the 
representative from Myanmar for his statement even though he had claimed 
that his government had “exercised the utmost restraint” in dealing with the 
September 2007 protests and failed to respond to the Special Rapporteur’s 
questions on the human rights situation in Myanmar.64
b. North Korea
Despite the fact that the government of North Korea is to blame for the 
misery and lack of freedom of its people,65 at the HRC, South Africa refused 
to acknowledge that greater international scrutiny might be an appropriate 
response to the dire human rights situation in the country. During its four 
years on the HRC, South Africa had the opportunity to vote on three reso-
lutions that expressed deep concerns about the human rights problems in 
North Korea. The resolutions each expressed regret at the country’s failure 
to cooperate with the HRC and sought to extend the mandate of the Special 
Rapporteur on human rights in the country. South Africa, however, abstained 
all three times.66 By contrast, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Djibouti, Ghana, 
Madagascar, Mauritius, and Zambia all voted in favor of the North Korea 
resolutions at least once.67
C. SRI LANKA
South Africa similarly worked to protect Sri Lanka from accountability for its 
human rights abuses. In the wake of the Sri Lankan government’s defeat of 
the Liberal Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) that effectively ended the country’s 
twenty-six-year civil war, the HRC in May 2009 called a special session 
on the human rights situation in Sri Lanka. The UN High Commissioner of 
Human Rights highlighted three areas of concern: the plight of the more 
than 200,000 internally displaced persons who were being confined to 
63. Statement by South Africa, The Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, U.N.H.R.C., 5th 
Spec. Sess., 1st plen. mtg., HRC Video Archive (2 Oct. 2007), available at http://www.
un.org/webcast/unhrc/archive.asp?go=015.
64. isHr, HumAn rigHts CounCil, 5tH speCiAl session, situAtion in myAnmAr, supra note 62, at 
3–4.
65. stepHAn HAggArd & mArCus nolAnd, Witness to trAnsFormAtion: reFugee insigHts into nortH 
koreA 12–15 (2011).
66. HRC, Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/15 (2008); HRC, Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic 
People’s Republic of North Korea, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/16 (2009); HRC, Situation 
of Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea, U.N. Doc. A/
HRC/13/14 (2010).
67. Id.
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camps partly because the government was trying to identify the LTTE fight-
ers among the civilians, the need for humanitarian assistance, and gross 
disregard for the inviolability of civilians during the conflict.68 However, Sri 
Lanka introduced its own self-congratulatory draft resolution, which became 
the basis for discussion.69 In response, Germany, on behalf of the EU and 
other states, including Mauritius, proposed a package of amendments that 
sought to remove Sri Lanka’s draft resolution’s emphasis on sovereignty, 
called for unimpeded access for humanitarian organizations, and stressed 
the importance of investigating all allegations of human rights violations to 
hold accountable those found guilty of such violations.70 However, before 
these amendments could be discussed, Cuba proposed that discussion end 
through a so-called “no-action motion.” Cuba’s proposal was put to a vote 
and won 22-17.71 South Africa was among those who voted to close the 
debate.72 Mauritius was the only African country to oppose the motion, 
while Gabon, Nigeria, Senegal, and Zambia abstained.73 With the amend-
ments defeated, South Africa voted for a weak resolution that was ultimately 
adopted.74 Most of the states that proposed the special session ended up 
voting against the final resolution.75 Human Rights Watch found it “deeply 
disappointing that a majority of the Human Rights Council decided to fo-
cus on praising a government whose forces have been responsible for the 
repeated shelling of civilians.”76
d. darfur/Sudan
South Africa also played a key role in obstructing HRC efforts in addressing 
the crisis in Darfur. After Kofi Annan reprimanded the HRC for its exagger-
68. Navi Pillay, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Message at the Human Rights 
Council Special Session on the Human Rights Situation in Sri Lanka (26 May 2009), 
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/1BBA5307164D4708
C12575C20054FB10?opendocument. 
69 Assistance to Sri Lanka in the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, HRC Draft 
Res. S-11, Rev. 2, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/S-11/L.1/Rev.2 (26 May 2009). 
70. Statement by Germany, The Human Rights Situation in Sri Lanka, U.N.H.R.C., 11th Spec. 
Sess., 3rd plen. mtg., HRC Video Archive (27 May 2009), http://www.un.org/webcast/
unhrc/archive.asp?go=0111.
71. Assistance to Sri Lanka in the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, HRC Res. 
S-11/1, 11th Spec. Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/S-11/1 (27 May 2009). See also Report 
of the Human Rights Council on its Eleventh Special Session, at 5, 9, U.N. Doc. A/
HRC/S-11/2, available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G09/144/09/
PDF/G0914409.pdf?OpenElement.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. The resolution was adopted 29-12 (six abstentions).
76. Human Rights Watch, Sri Lanka: Human Rights Council Fails Victims (27 May 2009), 
available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/05/27/sri-lanka-un-rights-council-fails-victims.
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ated focus on the Middle East—the HRC’s first three special sessions were 
all related to Israel—the HRC called its fourth special session, this time on 
“the human rights situation in Darfur,” held on 12 and 13 December 2006. 
However, from the beginning, the topic of Darfur elicited “politicisation 
reminiscent of the Commission at its worst.”77 The African Group was at the 
forefront of obstructing strong HRC action on Darfur. That said, the Darfur 
question resulted in bitter disputes among the African members themselves. 
Ghana, Mauritius, and, most resolutely, Zambia, stood up against the African 
Group.78 South Africa, however, sided with Algeria, Egypt, and the bulk of 
the African Group.79 In the years that followed the special session on Darfur, 
South Africa continued to oppose strong HRC action on Darfur and Sudan. 
The primary aim of the special session on Darfur evolved into sending 
a fact-finding mission to the region. Many states felt that the facts were suf-
ficiently established; yet the African Group insisted that the understanding 
of the Darfur conflict had been distorted by “far-reaching propaganda cam-
paigns” and “media-driven interpretations.”80 The EU, forced to accept that 
a fact-finding mission was inevitable, proposed that the Special Rapporteur 
on Sudan, assisted by a group of independent experts, lead the mission.81 
The African Group, however, wanted the mission to consist of representatives 
of states.82 After a month of wrangling, a compromise saw the creation of a 
team with three independent experts and two state representatives, including 
the Ambassador of Indonesia, who was a vocal defender and supporter of 
the Sudanese government.83 Nobel laureate Jody Williams was appointed 
leader of the mission. Sudan, however, refused to grant visas to the fact-
finding team. Significantly, the Indonesian representative resigned from 
the mission on 14 February 2007 after work had already begun.84 Unable 
77. Patrizia Scannella & Peter Splinter, The United Nations Human Rights Council: A Promise 
to be Fulfilled, 7 Hum. rts. l. rev. 41, 62 (2007).
78. Statements by Ghana and Zambia, U.N.H.R.C., 4th Sess., 10th plen. mtg., HRC 
Video Archive (16 Mar. 2007), available at http://www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/archive.
asp?go=070316; Statement by Mauritius, U.N.H.R.C., 4th Sess., 11th plen. mtg., HRC 
Video Archive (16 Mar. 2007), available at http://www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/archive.
asp?go=070316; Darfur, HRC Dec. 2/115, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/DEC/2/115 (28 Nov. 2006).
79. Darfur, supra note 78; Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan, HRC Res. 11/10, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/RES/11/10 (18 June 2009), available at http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/
HRC/resolutions/A_HRC_RES_11_10.pdf.
80. Statement by Algeria on behalf of the African Group), Human Rights Situation in Darfur, 
U.N.H.R.C., 4th Spec. Sess., 1st plen. mtg., HRC Video Archive (12 Dec. 2006), avail-
able at http://www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/archive.asp?go=014.
81 isHr, HumAn rigHts CounCil, 4tH speCiAl session 7 (2006), available at http://olddoc.ishr.
ch/hrm/council/other/cmreports/specialsessions/Fourth_Special_Session.pdf.
82. Id.
83. Letter from Hillel C. Neuer, Executive Director of UN Watch, to Ambassador Luis Alfonso 
De Alba, President of the Human Rights Council (1 Feb. 2007), available at http://www.
unwatch.org/site/apps/nlnet/content3.aspx?c=bdKKISNqEmG&b=2607541&ct=3687691. 
84. HRC, Report of the High-Level Mission on the situation of human rights in Darfur pur-
suant to Human Rights Council decision S-4/101, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/80 (9 Mar. 
2007).
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to enter Darfur, the team conducted interviews in Addis Ababa, Geneva, 
N’Djamena, and refugee camps in Eastern Chad.85 The mission concluded 
that “[w]ar crimes and crimes against humanity continue across the region” 
and that while rebel forces were “guilty of serious abuses of human rights 
. . . the principal pattern is one of a violent counterinsurgency campaign 
waged by the Government of Sudan in concert with Janjaweed/militia and 
targeting mostly civilians.”86 
The HRC was split on whether to accept the report or not. Algeria argued 
that because the Mission had not visited Sudan and because not all members 
had visited Chad, the report had no legal standing.87 However, six of the 
thirteen African Group members argued that the report was legitimate; South 
Africa was not among the six.88 Zambia pinpointed the underlying problem: 
bickering over procedural matters was a “way of diverting the attention of 
the Council from doing what [they] are expected to do.”89 
After the presentation of the Williams report, the EU and the African 
Group circulated two competing resolutions on the situation in Darfur. A 
compromise resolution adopted by consensus “took note” of the Williams 
report and declined to mention the Sudanese government or other purveyors 
of violence in Darfur.90 The resolution created a new expert group to work 
closely with the Sudanese government to “foster the implementation” of 
various UN resolutions and recommendations on Darfur, and to monitor the 
human rights situation in the region.91 Although the expert group reported 
“few recommendations have been fully implemented or reportedly had a 
tangible impact on the ground,” they also noted some areas of improve-
ment.92 Despite the promise provided by this report, the HRC “squandered” 
the work of the expert group and quietly ended its mandate in late 2007.93 
Darfur was placed under the mandate of the less influential and less well-
resourced Special Rapporteur for Sudan.94 
85. Id. at 6.
86. Id. at 76.
87. Statement by Algeria, U.N.H.R.C., 4th Sess., 10th plen. mtg., HRC Video Archive (16 
Mar. 2007), available at http://www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/archive.asp?go=070316.
88. Statements by Ghana, Senegal and Zambia, U.N.H.R.C., 4th Sess., 10th plen. mtg., 
HRC Video Archive (16 Mar. 2007), available at http://www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/
archive.asp?go=070316; Statements by Cameroon, Mauritius and Nigeria, U.N.H.R.C., 
4th Sess., 11th plen. mtg., Hrc Video Archive (16 Mar. 2007), available at http://www.
un.org/webcast/unhrc/archive.asp?go=070316.
89. Statement by Zambia, U.N.H.R.C., 4th Sess., 10th plen. mtg, HRC Video Archive (16 
Mar. 2007), available at http://www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/archive.asp?go=070316.
90. Situation of Human Rights in Darfur, HRC Res. 4/8, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/4/8 (30 Mar. 
2007).
91. Id.
92. Human Rights Council, Human Rights Situations That Require the Council’s Attention, 
Final Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Darfur, ¶2, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/6/19 
(28 Nov. 2007).
93. Human Rights Watch, UN: Unacceptable Compromise by Rights Council on Darfur 
(15 Dec. 2007), available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2007/12/13/un-unacceptable-
compromise-rights-council-darfur.
94. Id.
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In September 2008, the Special Rapporteur on human rights in the Sudan 
reported that she was denied access to certain officials and that one of her 
staff was denied a visa to Sudan.95 She also reported that “the human rights 
situation on the ground remains grim” and cited concerns about an overall 
deterioration in the country.96 The African Group, however, spoke of the 
“commendable interaction” that had always taken place between the HRC 
and the Sudanese government, claiming that there had been an “improvement 
in the situation on the ground,” and that it was thus “seriously considering” 
ending the mandate on Sudan.97 However, Ghana broke from this narrative 
and noted that “grave violations” continue to occur in Sudan.98 In concert 
with Burkina Faso and Zambia, Ghana urged the Sudanese government to 
adopt the HRC recommendations.99 South Africa remained silent. In the 
end, the HRC passed a consensual resolution that extended the mandate for 
Sudan by only nine months, rather than the usual twelve months.100 At the 
end of the nine months, during the HRC’s eleventh session, Egypt, on behalf 
of the African Group, introduced a resolution to discontinue the mandate 
on Sudan.101 In reply, the EU proposed amendments to the African Group’s 
draft resolution to extend the mandate for one year. The EU’s proposed 
amendments were adopted 20-19 (eight abstentions).102 The amended draft 
resolution was then adopted 20-18 (nine abstentions). South Africa was one 
of seven African countries to vote against the amendments,103 and one of 
five to vote against the final resolution.104
95. CHR, Human Rights Situations that Require the Council’s Attention: Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/9/13 
(2008) (by Simar Samar).
96. Id. ¶ 76.
97. Statement by Egypt (on behalf of the African Group), U.N.H.R.C., 9th Sess., 11th plen. 
mtg., HRC Video Archive (16 Sept. 2008), available at http://www.un.org/webcast/
unhrc/archive.asp?go=080916. A summary of the meeting can be found at: Press Re-
lease, UNHRC, Human Rights Council Adopts Five Texts, Extends Mandates Of Special 
Procedures On Sudan And Burundi (24 Sept. 2008), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/
huricane/huricane.nsf/0/B64084F92EA8ADB9C12574CE00596D3F?opendocument.
98. Id.
99. isHr, HumAn rigHts CounCil, dAily updAte, 9tH session 4-5 (2008) (on file with author).
100. Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan, HRC Res. 9/17, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/9/17 
(18 Sept. 2008), available at http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/HRC/resolutions/A_HRC_
RES_9_17.pdf.
101. Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan, HRC Draft Res. 11/L.17, U.N. Doc. A/
HRC/11/L.17 (16 June 2009), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/
LTD/G09/142/34/PDF/G0914234.pdf?OpenElement.
102. Statement by Germany (on behalf of the EU, Canada, Switzerland, Norway, Japan and 
the United States), U.N.H.R.C., 11th Sess., 29th plen. mtg., HRC Video Archive (18 June 
2009), available at http://www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/archive.asp?go=090618.
103. The others were Angola, Cameroon, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, and Madagascar.
104. The others were Cameroon, Djibouti, Egypt, and Nigeria. Situation of Human Rights in 
the Sudan, supra note 79.
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E. democratic Republic of the Congo
Although the human rights situation in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC) remains dire—it has no special procedures mandate—this 
was not always the case. The African Group and South Africa should bear 
much of the blame. Despite reports to contrary, in March 2008 the African 
Group argued that the 2006 presidential election in the DRC “had provided 
the country with a democratic environment conducive to the promotion 
and protection of human rights.”105 The African Group also argued that the 
“mandate has not been to the benefit of the DRC” and because the gov-
ernment of the DRC did not welcome the mandate its renewal would be 
“counterproductive.”106 The African Group proposed replacing the mandate 
on the DRC with a group of seven thematic mandate holders to report and 
make recommendations within their respective mandates on the problems 
in DRC.107 The African Group’s proposal was adopted without a vote.108
In November 2008, as fighting flared up in the province of North Kivu, 
France led a call for a special session on the DRC.109 South Africa, despite 
“deploring” the violence that had affected “long-suffering people” of the 
DRC, was not among the signatories.110 Rather, South Africa associated itself 
with the African Group, which had initially tried to defer the special session. 
Once the special session was called, the African Group predictably tried 
(and succeeded) to weaken the HRC’s action on the DRC.111 France pro-
posed sending nine different special procedures to investigate the problems 
in Eastern DRC and to report at the HRC’s March 2009 session.112 However, 
the African Group and its allies proposed their own resolution, which was 
adopted without a vote.113 In the words of UN Watch, the “toothless text” 
failed to “investigate the mass murder, rape and other war crimes that are 
making the Eastern Congo a living hell.”114
105. Statement by Egypt (on behalf of the African Group), U.N.H.R.C., 7th Sess., 34th plen. 
mtg., HRC Video Archive (20 Mar. 2008), available at http://www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/
archive.asp?go=080320.
106. Id.
107. Technical Cooperation and Advisory Services in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
HRC Res. 7/20, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/7/20 (2008).
108. Id.
109. HRC, Report of the Human Rights Council on its 8th Special Session, at 6, ¶ 2, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/S-8/2 (16 Jan. 2009).
110. Statement by South Africa, U.N.H.R.C., 8th Spec. Sess., 1st plen. mtg., HRC Video Archive 
(18 June 2009), available at http://www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/archive.asp?go=090618.
111. isHr, CounCil Alert: HumAn rigHts CounCil, 10tH session 3-4 (2009).
112. HRC, Report of the Human Rights Council on its 8th Special Session, supra note 109, 
at 4-5 ¶ 10–12.
113. Id. at 8–9 ¶ 21–25.
114. UN Watch Slams “Toothless” Resolution on Congo, in Speech to UN Rights Council 
Special Session, un WAtCH (1 Dec. 2008), available at http://www.unwatch.org/site/
apps/nlnet/content2.aspx?c=bdKKISNqEmG&b=1316871&ct=6421521.
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In March 2009, a year after the country mandate on the DRC was 
terminated, the EU made one more effort to reinstall the mandate on the 
DRC.115 The seven thematic mandate holders appointed by the HRC re-
ported that the human rights situation had “further deteriorated” over the 
past year.116 The DRC government, by contrast, expressed “surprise” at such 
“statements which are diametrically opposed to the reality in the field.”117 
The African Group, for its part, noted the DRC government’s “unwavering” 
commitment to improve the human rights situation in the country.118 Based 
on the remaining problems rather than the claimed achievements, the EU 
sought to appoint an independent expert to advise the DRC government on 
measures to end impunity, to strengthen victims’ access to justice, to end 
sexual violence, to protect and assist internally displaced persons, and to 
assess the progress made.119 However, the African Group then introduced its 
own draft resolution and forced a discussion of its text, rather than that of the 
EU.120 The African Group’s resolution was upbeat about the progress made 
in the DRC. It did not criticize the DRC government, nor note its particular 
responsibilities, and it made no call for the establishment of a country man-
date on the DRC.121 The draft did, however, ask the seven thematic special 
procedures, whose previous report it “noted,” to report to the HRC in one 
year.122 The EU then proposed amendments to the African text, including the 
condemnation of the various human rights violations and forming a group 
to assist the government.123 However, the amendments were rejected in a 
close vote (18-21, eight abstentions), which again saw the African Group 
split, with South Africa among those who voted against the amendments, 
115. isHr, CounCil updAte – item 4, d.r.C. HumAn rigHts CounCil, 10tH session (2009).
116. HRC, Combined Report on special procedures on technical assistance to the Govern-
ment of the Democratic Republic of Congo and urgent examination of the situation in 
the east of the country, ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/59 (5 Mar. 2009).
117. Statement by Democratic Republic of the Congo, U.N.H.R.C., 10th Sess., 25th plen. 
mtg., HRC Video Archive (17 Mar. 2009), available at http://www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/
archive.asp?go=010.
118. Statement by Egypt (on behalf of the African Group), U.N.H.R.C., 10th Sess., 25th plen. 
mtg., HRC Video Archive (17 Mar. 2009), available at http://www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/
archive.asp?go=090317.
119. HRC, Technical Cooperation and Advisory Assistance in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/L.1 (12 Mar. 2009).
120. The African Group called for a vote on whether to vote on its resolution rather than that 
of the EU. The vote went the way of the African Group’s text, 30–15 (two abstentions). 
HRC, Report of the Human Rights Council on its Tenth Session, ¶796, U.N. Doc. A/
HRC/10/29 (9 Nov. 2009).
121. HRC, Technical Assistance and Capacity-Building, Situation of Human Rights in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Strengthening of Technical Cooperation and 
Consultative Services, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/L.3 (17 Mar. 2009).
122. Id. ¶ 5.
123. HRC, Technical Cooperation and Advisory Assistance in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, supra note 119, ¶ 19.
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and Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mauritius, Senegal, and Zambia abstaining.124 
South Africa was then among the thirty-three countries (14 abstentions) to 
vote for the weak African Group resolution.125
In both March 2010 and March 2011, the group of seven mandate 
holders reported that the human rights situation in the DRC had not im-
proved.126 In their March 2011 report the group also concluded that they 
had achieved all they could and stated that the DRC would be best served 
by a single mandate focused on the country.127 This was never going to 
happen. The African Group’s ensuing draft resolution “noted” the report as 
well the group’s recommendation that their mandate be ended.128 Nothing 
was put in its place. 
IV. THEMATIC HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES
South Africa has been much more willing to speak for victims of past and 
present abuses when the matter is organized under a theme. However, South 
Africa’s interventions are tainted by three prominent characteristics: namely 
they constantly interpret matters as a conflict between North and South, work 
to curtail freedom of expression, and fail to honor the universality of human 
rights. The remainder of this section discusses South Africa’s actions around 
the themes of race, religion and freedom of expression, sexual orientation, 
and socioeconomic rights.
A. Race-Related Human Rights Abuses
At the HRC, South Africa drew attention to the racially discriminatory aspects 
of migration, asylum, the fight against terrorism, and criminal imprisonment 
and sentencing. South Africa has been adamant that race-related issues 
should be discussed in the context of the Durban process, named after the 
city where the 2001 World Conference against Racism (WCAR) was held.129 
124. HRC, Report of the Human Rights Council on its Tenth Session, supra note 120, ¶ 802.
125. Id. ¶ 804.
126. Press Release, ISHR, Joint Report on DRC Calls for Establishment of Country Mandate 
(14 Apr. 2011), available at http://www.ishr.ch/archive-council/1050-joint-report-on-drc-
calls-for-establishment-of-country-mandate.
127. Id.
128. HRC, The Human Rights Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and 
the Strengthening of Technical Cooperation and Consultative Services, U.N. Doc. A/
HRC/16/L.35 (2011).
129. Interview with International Civil Servant, in Geneva (23 Feb. 2012). See also Statement 
of South Africa, on behalf of African Group, U.N. Durbin Review Conference, U.N. 
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The 2001 conference was a controversial affair largely because of efforts to 
cast Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories as racist, demands for 
an apology to and compensation for victims of past slavery, and widespread 
anti-Semitism on display at the parallel NGO conference.130 In 2006, the 
General Assembly charged the HRC with preparing a review conference 
on the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action (DDPA).131 Although 
many considered WCAR to have been a disaster and the resultant Durban 
process a “huge banana peel,”132 South Africa outspokenly defended the 
Durban process. 
Ahead of the review conference, many made a concerted effort to avoid 
the unpleasantness of the WCAR. The African Group’s preliminary report 
presented by South Africa made no mention of Israel or the conflict in the 
Middle East. In another more ambiguous incident during the drafting of the 
report, South Africa suggested shortening the reference to the Holocaust.133 
Syria and Iran seized upon the mention of the Holocaust, with the former 
claiming “it is unclear what percentage of Jews were killed in the Holocaust, 
some say three million, some say one, some say even less.”134 Argentina and 
various European states objected, with Denmark stating it was “appalled” 
by the discussion.135 South Africa quickly closed off the nasty direction of 
the discussion by accepting the EU’s proposed text.136 Still, by February 
2009—the conference was to be held in April—the draft outcome document 
still contained numerous paragraphs on Israel. Canada, Germany, Poland, 
the Netherlands, and the US decided to boycott the conference, decisions 
South Africa described as “regrettable.”137 
   Durbin Review Conference Video Archive (24 Apr. 2006), available at http://www.un.org/
webcast/durbanreview/archive.asp?go=090424#; Statement of South Africa (on behalf 
of the Africa Group), U.N. Durbin Review Conference Prep. Comm., 2d Substantive 
Sess., HRC Video Archive (6 Oct. 2008), available at http://www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/
archive.asp?go=081006. For more information on the Durbin Conference, see World 
Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, 
Durban, South Africa 31 Aug.-7 Sept. 2001, available at http://www.un.org/WCAR/.
130. Press Release, Dep’t of Pub. Info., Discrimination Against Minorities, Middle East, 
Reparations for Slavery Among Issues Raised at World Conference Against Racism (1 
Sept. 2001), available at http://www.un.org/WCAR/pressreleases/rd-d21.html.
131. HRC, Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 60/251 of 15 March 2006 Entitled 
“Human Rights Council,” U.N. Doc. A/HRC/2/L.27/Rev.2 (22 Nov. 2006).
132. Hon. rAynell AndreyCHuk & Hon. moBinA s.B. JAFFer, CAnAdiAn senAte stAnding Committee 
on HumAn rigHts, CAnAdA And tHe united nAtions HumAn rigHts CounCil: A time For serious 
re-evAluAtion 34 (2008). 
133. Intersessional Working Group for the Durban Review Conference, internet Centre Anti-rACism 
europe (22 Jan. 2009), available at http://www.icare.to/livereport/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=160%3Ageneve-januari-2009&catid=4%3Aarchive-
reports&lang=en.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, Statement on behalf of the African Group, Durban Review 
Conference (20 Apr. 2009), available at http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2009/
dzum0421.html).
2014 South Africa and the UN Human Rights Council 111
The fear that the review conference would become a platform for anti-
Semites was soon realized. The Iranian president and Holocaust denier, Mah-
moud Ahmadinejad, delivered a poisonous speech in which he complained 
that Western support for Israel—which he referred to as being made up of 
“genocidal racists”—was established under the “pretext” of compensating 
for racism in Europe.138 The ambassadors of France, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom walked out in response. South Africa, a country that has repeat-
edly spoken about the need to curb freedom of expression to prevent hateful 
speech, said nothing about the Iranian leader’s views, but instead expressed 
its “concern at the manner in which some parties chose to articulate their 
opposition to the statement of a sovereign head of state.”139
At the WCAR, African states demanded an apology and reparations for 
slavery. Most European states were willing to apologize, but not to recognize 
slavery as a crime against humanity or to pay reparations. According to Patrick 
Bond, former South African president Thabo Mbeki “colluded with the EU” 
to defeat the demand of NGOs and African leaders for slavery reparations.140 
After the WCAR, however, South Africa came out more strongly in favor of 
reparations.141 The issue of slavery continues to crop up in the HRC, but 
demands for reparations have significantly decreased. South Africa, however, 
has continued to raise the matter, including recently during a special session 
on the Syrian government’s crackdown on an uprising that began in March 
2011.142 In response to a joint statement by special procedures mandate 
holders that recommended Syrian victims’ families should be compensated, 
South Africa expressed the hope that the mandate holders, for the sake of 
“consistency and impartiality,” would also demand compensation for the 
victims of transatlantic slavery and colonization.143 While the moral case for 
reparations for slavery is very strong, South Africa’s invocation of reparations 
for slavery here is highly selective. Horrific as the transatlantic slave trade 
was, during the drafting of the outcome document of for the 2009 Durban 
Review Conference, the African Group sought the deletion of reference to 
both the Arab slave trade and the involvement of Africans themselves in the 
138. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Ahmadinejad Speech: Full Text, BBC neWs (21 Apr. 2009), 
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8010747.stm.
139. Statement by South Africa, U.N. Durban Review Conference, 12th mtg., Statement by 
South Africa, U.N. Durbin Review Conference Video Archive (24 Apr. 2009), available 
at http://www.un.org/webcast/durbanreview/archive.asp?go=090424. 
140. pAtriCk Bond, AFriCAn development/governAnCe, soutH AFriCAn suBimperiAlism And nepAd 25–26 
(2004), available at http://www.networkideas.org/feathm/dec2004/Conference_Papers/
South_African_Subimperialism_NEPAD_PB.pdf.
141. Zuma, supra note 60.
142. Statement by South Africa, U.N.H.R.C., 16th Spec. Sess., 2nd plen. mtg., HRC Video Ar-
chive (29 Apr. 2011), available at http://www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/archive.asp?go=0116.
143. Id.
Vol. 36112 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
slave trade.144 Yet former Senegal president Abdoulaye Wade has said that 
if reparations were due, then he would also be liable, as his ancestors had 
thousands of slaves.145 South Africa’s selective morality detracts from the 
justness of the cause and suggests that slavery is not just about the victims, 
but also a stick with which to beat the West. 
b. freedom of Expression and the defamation of Religion
HRC debates about the right to free expression have been dominated by 
unhappiness over the portrayal of Islam in the West, which is alleged to 
be offensive, demeaning, and even hateful. In the HRC, as well as in the 
General Assembly plenary and the General Assembly Third Committee, the 
OIC and its allies have sought to reshape the international normative and 
legal landscape to address their concerns.146 However, the OIC’s proposals 
threaten various freedoms—of religion and belief, of speech, of the press—
and potentially legitimize the oppression of religious minorities and political 
critics. The battle between free expression and more reverence for religion 
continues to surface in various aspects of the HRC’s work. 
Central to the OIC’s efforts have been a series of “combating defama-
tion of religions” resolutions. The first such resolution was presented in the 
General Assembly in 1999 and was presented in the HRC every year from 
2007 until 2010.147 The defamation resolutions purported to be about all 
religions, but were mostly about Islam.148 Claims that the “defamation of 
religions is a serious affront to human dignity leading to a restriction on the 
freedom of religion” were characteristic.149 The resolutions further expressed 
concern over a global rise in the number of statements attacking Islam; 
about states profiling and monitoring Muslims; about the equation of “any 
religion” with terrorism;150 and about “the deliberate stereotyping of religions, 
their adherents and sacred persons in the media, as well as programs and 
agendas pursued by extremist organizations and groups aimed at creating 
144. Press Release, UN Watch, Highlights from Durban II Drafting Committee Meeting (23 
Jan. 2009), available at http://www.unwatch.org/site/apps/nlnet/content2.aspx?c=bdKKI
SNqEmG&b=1316871&ct=6645721.
145. Rhoda Howard-Hassmann, Reparations to Africa and the Group of Eminent Persons, in 
CAHiers d’Études AFriCAines 173–74, ¶7 (2004).
146 About OIC, orgAnizAtion oF islAmiC CooperAtion, available at http://www.oicun.org/2/23/.
147. Dimitrina Petrova, “Smoke and Mirrors”: The Durban Review Conference and Human 
Rights Politics at the United Nations, 10 Hum. rts. l. rev 129 (2009).
148. Id.
149. Combating Defamation of Religions, HRC Res. 13/16, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/13/16 
(15 Apr. 2010).
150. Combating Defamation of Religions, HRC Res 7/19, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/7/19 
(27 Mar. 2008).
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and perpetuating stereotypes about certain religions, in particular when 
condoned by governments.”151 Most controversially, the resolutions noted:
that everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which should be exercised 
with responsibility and may therefore be subject to limitations as provided by 
law and necessary for respect of the rights or reputations of others, protection 
of national security or of public order, public health or morals and respect for 
religions and beliefs.152 
Critics objected to the defamation of religion resolutions on a number 
of different grounds. They objected to the emphasis on Islam; questioned 
the idea that religions can be defamed; argued that it is not religions that 
should be protected, but the people who practice a specific religion; and 
charged that the defamation resolutions “entrench repression and violence 
against non-believers, members of religious minorities and political dis-
sidents,” weaken and distort current international human rights guarantees 
on non-discrimination and freedom of expression and of religion, and are 
ripe for abuse.153 
In the HRC, the defamation resolutions were always put to a vote. The 
resolution gradually lost support, passing with only 20-17 in 2010.154 In March 
2011, the defamation resolution was replaced by the consensually adopted 
resolution on religious intolerance.155 South Africa was one of the strongest 
defenders of the defamation resolutions and always voted in favor.156 In fact, 
between 2008 and 2010 South Africa and Indonesia, an OIC member, were 
the only two countries that Freedom House classifies as “free” to vote for 
the resolution.157 In 2010, Zambia voted against the resolution, while Cam-
eroon, Ghana, Madagascar, and Mauritius abstained.158 Furthermore, India, 
which holds one of the world’s largest Muslim populations, abstained on all 
four votes on the defamation resolutions, citing concerns that the notion of 
defamation could be abused to suppress free expression.159 
151. Combating Defamation of Religions, HRC Res 10/22, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/10/22, 
(27 Mar. 2009).
152. Combating Defamation of Religions, HRC Res. 4/9, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/4/9, 
(3 Mar. 2007).
153. Over 100 Organisations Call on UN Human Rights Council to Reject “Defamation” 
and “Denigration” of Religions, IFEX (9 Mar. 2011), available at http://www.ifex.org/
international/2011/03/09/defamation_of_religions/.
154. Combating Defamation of Religions, HRC Res. 13/16, supra note 149.
155. Combating Intolerance, Negative Stereotyping and Stigmatization of, and Discrimination, 
Incitement to Violence and Violence Against, Persons Based on Religion or Belief, HRC 
Res. 16/18, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/16/18 (12 Apr. 2011).
156. Combating Defamation of Religions, HRC Res. 13/16, supra note 149, at 5.
157. Freedom House, Freedom in tHe World 2008–2010.
158. Combating Defamation of Religions, HRC Res. 13/16, supra note 149.
159. Statement of India, U.N.H.R.C., 4th Sess., 31st plen. mtg., HRC Video Archive (30 Mar. 
2007), available at http://www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/archive.asp?go=070330.
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In the context of the defamation resolutions, one should also mention 
South Africa’s stance on HRC Resolution 6/37, “Elimination of all forms 
of religious intolerance and of discrimination based on religion or belief,” 
which was sponsored by the EU.160 The gist of the resolution was to promote 
tolerance through education and dialogue. The resolution also extended the 
mandate of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief.161 The 
OIC objected to a number of aspects of the resolution: its failure to enshrine 
respect for all religions; its insistence on the “right” to change one’s religion; 
and an approach that sees the solution in dialogue and tolerance.162 The 
OIC subsequently abstained from voting for the December 2007 resolution, 
which was adopted by 29-0 (eighteen abstentions).163 South Africa also 
abstained, finding it “inconceivable” that the special rapporteur’s mandate 
did not include “the key issue of monitoring the role that may be played 
by the media in inciting religious hatred,” which South Africa regarded as 
a “glaring mistake.”164 
In March 2009, South Africa was the only state to vote against Reso-
lution 10/25, which was adopted 22-1 (twenty-four abstentions).165 This 
EU-sponsored resolution built on the aforementioned Resolution 6/37 in 
its emphasis on dialogue, tolerance, and protection for religious minorities. 
Resolution 10/25 additionally urged states to ensure that persons of certain 
religions are not discriminated against in their access to social benefits, 
public services, humanitarian assistance, housing, etc.166 The OIC raised 
various objections to the resolution but nevertheless said that it supported 
“the elimination of religious intolerance” and would thus abstain.167 South 
Africa defended its No vote by questioning the resolution’s insistence that 
the media has “an important role to play in promoting tolerance, respect for 
religious and cultural diversity.”168 South Africa wanted a greater castigation 
160. Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, 
HRC Res. 6/37, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/6/37, (14 Dec. 2007).
161. Id. ¶ 18. 
162. Statement by Pakistan on behalf of the Organization of Islamic Conference, U.N.H.R.C., 
6th Sess., 34th plen. mtg., Item 3, HRC Video Archive (14 Dec. 2007), available at http://
www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/archive.asp?go=071214.
163. Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, 
HRC Res. 6/37, supra note 160, at 9. Cuba, India, Russia, and six African countries 
voted for the resolution.
164. Statement by South Africa, U.N.H.R.C., 6th Sess., 33rd plen. mtg., HRC Video Archive 
(14 Dec. 2007), available at http://www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/archive.asp?go=071214.
165. Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief and its Impact on the Enjoyment of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, HRC Res. 10/25, U.N. Doc A/HRC/RES/10/25 (27 Mar. 2009). 
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167. Statement by Pakistan (on behalf of the Organization of Islamic Conference), U.N.H.R.C., 
10th Sess., 44th plen. mtg., HRC Video Archive (27 Mar. 2009), available at http://www.
un.org/webcast/unhrc/archive.asp?go=090327.
168. Statement by South Africa, U.N.H.R.C., 10th Sess., 44th plen. mtg., HRC Video Archive 
(27 Mar. 2009), available at http://www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/archive.asp?go=090327.
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of the media for its alleged role “in perpetuating the negative stereotyping 
of religions and incitement to religious hatred.”169 South Africa also pointed 
to the resolution’s mention of socioeconomic rights without any mention of 
their justiciability as a further reason for its vote.170
Yet another instance of South Africa acting to limit freedom of expression 
revolves around the mandate for the Special Rapporteur on the promotion 
and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression. During the 
HRC’s seventh session in March 2008, Canada submitted a draft resolution to 
extend the mandate of the aforementioned Special Rapporteur.171 However, 
Pakistan, on behalf of the OIC, put forward an amendment, co-sponsored 
by the African and Arab groups, requesting the Special Rapporteur to re-
port on instances in which the abuse of the right of freedom of expression 
constitutes an act of racial and religious discrimination.172 This amendment, 
Pakistan claimed, would make the resolution more “balanced.”173 Those 
who opposed the amendment argued that it shifted the focus of the resolu-
tion from the protection of the right of freedom of expression to limitations 
of that right.174 However, the amendment was adopted by a vote of 27-17 
(three abstentions), with South Africa voting for the amendment.175 Cuba 
then proposed adding “the importance for all forms of media to report and 
to deliver information in a fair and impartial manner” to an article on the 
importance of the media for freedom of expression.176 Cuba’s amendment 
was adopted by 29-15 (three abstentions), with South Africa again voting in 
favor.177 The twice-amended resolution was adopted 32-0 (15 abstentions), 
with South Africa voting in favor and the original sponsors having withdrawn 
their support.178 
Free expression has also come under threat through efforts to write ad-
ditional standards into international law.179 In this push, South Africa has 
169. Id. 
170. Id.
171. Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to 
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, HRC Res. 7/36. U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/7/36 (28 
Mar. 2008).
172. isHr, HumAn rigHts CounCil, dAily updAte, 7tH session 13 (2008), available at http://olddoc.
ishr.ch/hrm/council/dailyupdates/session_007/28_march_2008.pdf.
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175. HRC, Report of the Human Rights Council on its Seventh Session, ¶ 305, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/7/78 (14 July 2008).
176. Statement by Cuba, U.N.H.R.C., 7th Sess., 42nd plen. mtg., HRC Video Archive (28 
Mar. 2008), available at http://www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/archive.asp?go=080328. 
177. HRC, Report of the Human Rights Council on its Seventh Session, supra note 175, ¶ 
309.
178. Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to 
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, supra note 171.
179. For more on the politicking over additional standards, Petrova, supra note 147, at 7.
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staunchly supported the initiative and even acted as chair of the relevant 
committee, the Ad Hoc Committee for the elaboration of standards.180 In 
their pursuit, South Africa and its allies dismissed numerous UN reports that 
found no need for such additional standards or that warned of the dangers 
of limiting free speech.181 Consider, for example, Article 20(2) of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which is often brought up in 
the discussion about additional standards. Article 20(2) explicitly states, “Any 
advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement 
to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.”182 Article 
20(2), a rights-limiting provision, has always been interpreted narrowly; the 
provision has its origins in the type of incitement used against the Jews and 
other groups during the Holocaust.183 For South Africa, such a narrow inter-
pretation is not enough; it wants, among other things, an expanded notion 
of “incitement to religious hatred.”184 To see what this might mean, consider 
a proposal from South Africa’s ally on the issue of additional standards, the 
OIC, to criminally prosecute those who fall foul of the “legal prohibition of 
publication of material that negatively stereotypes, insults, or uses offensive 
language on matters regarded by followers of any religion or belief as sacred 
or inherent to their dignity as human beings.”185 
C. Sexual orientation and Gender Identity
In June 2011, South Africa tabled a resolution titled “Human rights, sexual 
180. Statement by South Africa, U.N.H.R.C., 10th Sess., 38th plen. mtg., HRC Video Archive 
(24 Mar. 2009), available at http://www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/archive.asp?go=090324.
181. U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on Incitement to Racial And Reli-
gious Hatred and the Promotion of Tolerance, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/2/6 (20 Sept. 2006); 
UN Group of Five Experts, Report on the Content and Scope of Substantive Gaps in the 
Existing International Instruments to Combat Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia 
and Related Intolerance, at 130, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/wg.3/6 (27 Aug. 2007). For a report 
that instructed the Council to “to consider the possibility of adopting complementary 
standards,” see Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief and the Special 
Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and 
Related Intolerance, Report pursuant to H.R.C. Dec. 1/107, at 61, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/2/3 
(20 Sept. 2006).
182. International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1996, G.A. Res. 
21/2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., art. 20(2), U.N. Doc. A/Res/21/2200 (1996) (entered 
into force 23 March 1976). 
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orientation, and gender identity,” which was adopted by 23-19 (three absten-
tions).186 The resolution expressed grave concern at violence and discrimina-
tion committed against people because of their sexual orientation, requested 
a report on violence and discriminatory laws and practices against persons 
because of their sexual orientation, and called for dialogue on the report’s 
findings.187 South Africa was widely praised for its leadership on such a 
progressive resolution and for its courage in the face of vehement opposition 
from most of the OIC and the African Group, South Africa’s usual allies. 188
Commendable as the June 2011 resolution is, in March 2011 South Africa 
had presented a draft resolution that was much more in keeping with South 
Africa’s usual actions on the HRC: speaking the language of human rights 
but in reality blocking their advancement. The March 2011 draft resolution 
sought to establish an open-ended working group to define “sexual orienta-
tion” and its scope and parameters in international human rights law.189 The 
draft resolution further stated that the aforementioned working group should 
be the “single modality and framework” for all HRC deliberations on sexual 
orientation.190 This meant that no further discussion on matters related to 
sexual orientation would be permitted until the meaning of sexual orientation 
in the context of international law had been defined. Under pressure from 
the United States, which threatened to put forward its own draft resolution, 
South Africa withdrew its draft.191 Further pressure from international and 
especially South African civil society was decisive in pushing South Africa 
towards the progressive resolution of June 2011. 
d. development and Economic Rights
Yet another source of disagreement on the HRC has been over the status of 
and duties associated with economic rights. At bottom, the dispute is over 
186. Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, HRC Res. 17/. . ., U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/17/L.9/Rev.1 (15 June 2011). 
187. Id.
188. Press Release, ISHR, Historic Decision: Council Passes First-Ever Resolution on Sexual 
Orientation and Gender Identity (17 June 2011), available at http://www.ishr.ch/news/
historic-decision-council-passes-first-ever-resolution-sexual-orientation-gender-identity. 
For criticism of South Africa from the African Group, see: Statement by Nigeria (On 
Behalf of the African Group, U.N.H.R.C., 17th Sess., 31st plen. mtg., HRC Video Archive 
(17 June 2011), available at http://www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/archive.asp?go=110617.
189. The imperative need to respect the established procedures and practices of the General 
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tion into existing international human rights law, HRC Res. 16/. . ., ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/
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who should carry the burden of securing the various economic rights that are 
claimed. Developing countries look to the international community to carry 
a larger burden, whereas industrialized states insist that the state is primary 
in realizing the economic rights of its people. Central to these disputes are 
assertions of a right to development,192 which in turn have been accompanied 
by claims that economic rights are just as important as political rights and 
that all rights are indivisible. 
During HRC sessions, South Africa has frequently drawn attention to 
economic rights. In its most recent foreign policy blueprint, South Africa 
declared its intention to seek “the acknowledgement of economic, social 
and cultural rights [as being] on par with all other human rights” and to 
work with the NAM “to develop a legally binding instrument on the right 
to development.”193 However, there are two problematic aspects of South 
Africa’s approach to economic rights. 
The first relates to South Africa’s insistence that political and economic 
rights are equally important. The concern here is not with the vapidity of a 
claim of equivalence:194 Which political and which economic rights are we 
talking about? Is the right to not be tortured just as important as the right to 
housing? Rather, claims that political and economic rights are equally im-
portant create space for states to deflect attention away from their violations 
of political rights by pointing to their progress on realizing certain economic 
rights.195 Furthermore, although South Africa has spoken up to remind states 
that political rights are also important,196 it frequently neglects political 
rights. In its comments on Singapore’s UPR presentation, for example, South 
Africa praised Singapore’s economic achievements but said nothing about 
the curtailment of political freedoms in the country.197 In fact, South Africa 
encouraged Singapore to “maintain this focus.”198 Moreover, South Africa 
has signed on to resolutions that open the door to legitimize authoritarian 
systems, such as the Cuba-sponsored resolution on international solidarity, 
which claims that it is “persuaded that sustainable development can be 
promoted by peaceful coexistence, friendly relations and cooperation among 
states with different social, economic or political systems.”199 
192. Bonny Ibhawoh, The Right to Development: The Politics and Polemics of Power and 
Resistance, 33 Hum. rts. Q. 76 (2011).
193. S. Afr. Dep’t. Int’l Relations & Cooperation, supra note 9, at 19.
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196. isHr, HumAn rigHts CounCil Working group on tHe Future system oF expert AdviCe, HigHligHts, 
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The second concern relates to the state’s duty to secure the economic 
wellbeing of its people. The original Declaration on the Right to Develop-
ment was explicit: “the creation of conditions favourable to the development 
of peoples and individuals is the primary responsibility of their states.”200 
However, in HRC resolutions, states are assigned “the primary responsibility 
. . . for the creation of national and international conditions favourable to 
the realization of the right to development.201 The responsibilities of national 
governments are reduced, while blame and duty claims are pushed beyond 
the national level. International factors no doubt often contribute to local 
poverty, but the governments of poor countries should also bear much blame 
in this regard. South Africa repeatedly reminds the international community 
of its duties to the poor, but has been unwilling to blame the governments 
of poor countries or to stress their duties. To take one example, during South 
Africa’s comment on Zimbabwe’s UPR presentation, South Africa noted that 
Zimbabwe faces many obstacles to improving its human rights situation, 
among which South Africa chose to single out economic sanctions, rather 
than the government’s repression and economic mismanagement.
E. Universal periodic Review
One of the biggest flaws of the CHR was its selective scrutiny of abusive 
regimes; Cuba, for example, received a lot of attention, while Saudi Arabia 
did not. To address the selectivity problem, the creators of the HRC gave 
the new body a universal peer review mechanism whose regular reviews 
of all states were to be objective, universal, and cooperative.202 However, 
many details were left unspecified; the modalities of the UPR were to be 
finalized during the HRC’S first year. During this time, it was quickly agreed 
that the UPR would be based on a report on the human rights situation in 
a specific country. However, many disagreements remained. 
From the beginning, the African Group and South Africa argued for a 
mechanism that would leave states with maximal control over the final report. 
This would limit opportunities for criticism and would yield recommenda-
tions with as little binding power as possible. There are many examples of 
African efforts to make the UPR as unthreatening as possible. South Africa 
argued that a national report, drawn up by the state, should be the basis of 
200. Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res 41/128, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/128 
(4 Dec. 1986).
201. The Right to Development, HRC Res. 12/23, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/12/23 (2 Oct. 2009); 
The Right to Development, HRC Res. 21/32, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/21/32 (11 Oct. 
2012). 
202. G.A. Res. 60/251, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/251 (3 Apr. 2006). 
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review,203 thus marginalizing other sources of information (for example, from 
NGOs, special procedures, UN treaty bodies, and the OHCHR).204 The African 
Group said the national report should be written by states, with the option 
of consulting with national NGOs.205 The African Group further maintained 
that NGOs should play no role at the international (HRC) level.206 This was 
problematic because many states are hostile to NGOs and it would be 
easier for these local NGOs to speak before an international organization. 
The African Group’s proposal would also exclude influential international 
NGOs like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch from the process.
As for what to do when the state under review did not accept the 
recommendations made to it, the African Group dismissed the need for a 
vote and argued instead that the HRC should only adopt recommendations 
that had the consent of the concerned state.207 This would effectively give 
the state under review veto power over the HRC’s decision.208 South Africa 
strongly defended the African position, arguing that a consensus outcome 
was obligatory because the role of the international community was limited 
to providing assistance.209 
There was also some debate about the frequency of country reviews. 
Pakistan, on behalf of the OIC, proposed that the frequency should depend 
on a state’s level of development, with developed countries reviewed every 
three years and developing countries every five to seven years.210 The African 
Group wanted a cycle of three to five years, but agreed with the principle 
that developed and developing countries should be treated differently. This 
meant that countries with lesser domestic human rights problems should be 
reviewed more often than countries that typically have more serious human 
rights problems. Moreover, South Africa originally wanted the six weeks set 
aside for the UPR process to take place during the HRC’s regular sessions, 
which would have had the effect of displacing the HRC’s other work.211 
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Although not all of the South African and the African Group’s proposals 
were adopted, the modalities that were eventually adopted put states in a 
very dominant position. Even so, it was still possible to ask tough questions 
during the review. When Western states appeared for review, South Africa 
went straight to the biggest human rights problems in these states. South Af-
rica thus raised questions about racism and xenophobia (Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and Sweden), immigrants (France, 
Germany, and Sweden), indigenous peoples (Australia, Canada, New Zea-
land, and Sweden), gender equality or sexism (Australia, Netherlands, and 
Sweden), and discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation (Australia). 
South Africa’s interventions on Western states’ presentations were tough and 
terse, but largely reasonable. 
However, despite a declaration from South Africa’s current foreign minis-
ter, Maite Nkoane-Mashabane, that the review process should be “conducted 
and finalised in an open, transparent, and fair manner,”212 South Africa has 
failed to be tough on developing countries. It has occasionally asked hard 
questions of developing countries, such as Chad213 and Russia,214 but gener-
ally South Africa avoided suggestions that the state under review is violating 
political or civil rights. South Africa commented on the first-time presenta-
tions of Algeria, Azerbaijan, Burundi, Botswana, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Malaysia, Pakistan, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, and Singapore without 
raising concerns about violations of political or civil freedoms. When South 
Africa did touch upon such violations, it did so briefly and through a cloud 
of praise, thanks, and excuses. South Africa’s recommendations that Swazi-
land protect the institutions intended to protect democracy, that Cuba “look 
into the improvement of . . . access to justice,”215 and that China intensify 
its efforts at fostering civil society participation216 were as tough as South 
Africa got on these countries. 
V. CoNCLUSIoN
This article provided considerable evidence that apart from South Africa’s 
eventual stance on sexual orientation and, on a charitable reading, its stances 
on racism and economic rights, South Africa’s actions at the HRC have de-
212. Nkoana-Mashabane, supra note 5.
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Feb. 2009), available at http://www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/archive.asp?go=090204.
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liberately obstructed international progress on human rights. When one puts 
together South Africa’s efforts to weaken the UPR, its objection to country-
specific mandates and even to criticism of specific countries, its complaints 
about the use of special sessions to focus on specific countries,217 its repeated 
votes in favor of making the staff of the OHCHR “more representative,” and 
its support for a code of conduct for special rapporteurs, then it becomes 
clear that South Africa has been after a wholesale dismantling of the HRC’s 
ability to independently assess and put pressure on a specific country over its 
human rights record. South Africa’s actions on the HRC confirm the claims 
of those who argue that the country has become a defender of unpalatable 
regimes and an obstacle to the international promotion of human rights.
When Kofi Annan first presented his plans for a new United Nations 
human rights body he explicitly argued that only states with a strong com-
mitment to human rights should become members. Annan’s proposal stems 
from a liberal view that those who respect human rights at home are more 
likely to work for their promotion internationally. Few would question that 
South Africa is serious about respecting human rights domestically. How-
ever, there is a disjuncture between South Africa’s domestic commitments 
and its foreign policy, which, as this article has shown, frequently hinders 
the international promotion of human rights. Contrast, for example, South 
Africa’s behavior with that of Zambia, a country much poorer than South 
Africa and holding only a “partly free” ranking from Freedom House, but 
which has been a far stronger defender of human rights at the HRC. South 
Africa’s (and Zambia’s) actions on the Council thus raise questions about 
the link between regime type and support for human rights and points to a 
fruitful avenue for future research.
217. Abebe, supra note 204, at 1–35.
